Palma Massacre

June 2023

A Hidden Catastrophe, Uncovered

Just after 2pm on March 24, 2021, 500 rebels from the ISIS-affiliated al-Shabab group in northern Mozambique attacked the coastal town of Palma, adjacent to a 16,000-acre liquid natural gas (LNG) plant being built by TotalEnergies, and other partners, on the Afungi peninsula, south of town.

To assess the impact on the civilian population, I set up a survey team to go door to door in Palma and 15 surrounding villages from November 2022 to March 2023, with a survey designed according to UN guidelines, available online. They eventually visited 13,686 homes. The raw data was audited by a data specialist, Ascent, then cross-checked with community leaders and groups on the ground. In total, 1,193 were killed or are missing (presumed dead) and a further 209 people were kidnapped, making a total of 1,402 affected. The dead or missing include 156 children under 18; 24 children were also abducted. Full results below or you can download a PDF of the article here (Or in Portuguese, or Swahili.).

It is important to stress the limited scope of this survey. This count is only for the dead and missing among civilian residents of Palma, related to the al-Shabab attack of March and April 2021. It does not include injuries, deaths among Total contractors (which my reporting suggests totalled at least 55), combatant deaths among the police, army and al-Shabab (which my reporting suggests totalled several hundred), or deaths of those killed by security forces in the attack’s aftermath.

Alex Perry, June 2023.

Figure 1: A total of at least 1,402 people were killed or went missing (and are presumed dead after two years), or were abducted in the Palma attack. This chart specifies the number of deaths per location; the red column is the total for all six districts of Palma (Bagala, Barabarane, Incularino, Muaha, Quelimane and Quilaua.)

Figure 2: Number of deaths per location, which each location is broken down into deaths per gender. Pink for female, blue for male, grey for gender unknown/not given.

Figure 3: This chart delineates causes of death or event. ‘Other’ includes uncommon categories, such as when people were burned alive in their homes or died in some manner while fleeing, or those deaths with multiple causes. ‘Unknown’ indicates no cause of death was provided, mostly accounted for by unidentified bodies found in the aftermath.

Figure 4: Pie chart showing the number of each type of death or event.

Figure 5: Bar chart showing the number of each type of death, where each type of death is broken down by gender. The total bar indicates the overall number of deaths. Pink is female, blue is male, grey is gender not given or unknown.

Figure 6: Only deaths where ages were provided are shown in this graphic. There are 78 cases where age has not been provided. Beige for children, blue for adults.

Figure 7: Only deaths where ages were provided are shown in this graphic. There are 78 cases where age was not provided.

Figure 8: Bar graphic showing the number of deaths for each age group. The unknown bar indicates 78 entries where an age was not provided.

Figure 9: Pie chart showing the number of deaths for each age group. The purple unknown section indicates entries where an age was not provided.

Figure 10: Bar chart showing the number of deaths per age for cases under 18 years old. The youngest death recorded was a baby of 2 months; the oldest was 105.

Figure 11: Bar graphics showing the number of deaths per age group for each location. Bagala, Barabarane, Incularino, Muaha, Quelimane and Quilaua are districts of Palma. The other 15 locations are villages surrounding Palma also affected by the attack, plus there is one death whose location is unknown/not specified.

Figure 12: Map showing the number of deaths in each region of Palma.

Figure 13:Map showing the number of deaths per village, in location.

Tables

Type of DeathCount
beheaded330
shot366
kidnaped209
drowned45
missing432
unknown7
other22
total1411

Figure 14: Table showing the number of each type of death. There are several instances where multiple causes of death were recorded for one person, resulting in the total count (1411) being greater than the total number of deaths (1402).

LocationCount
Bagala57
Barabarane97
Incularino202
Maganja67
Man’guna32
Matapata34
Mondlane38
Muaha93
Mute63
N’gueo23
Ncumbi44
Ngueo1
Olumbe62
Patacua24
Quelimane333
Quilaua134
Quionga46
Quirinde10
Quitunda16
Quiuia11
Senga14
unknown1
Total1402

Figure 153: Number of deaths per location. Bagala, Barabarane, Incularino, Muaha, Quelimane and Quilaua are districts of Palma. The other 15 locations are villages surrounding Palma also affected by the attack, plus there is one death whose location is unknown/not specified.

Man/Woman/ChildCount
Child180
Man870
Woman273
Unknown79
Total1402

Figure 16: Number of deaths per woman, man and child. ‘Unknown’ indicates where the gender of the deceased was not provided.

LocationAverage Age
Bagala39.1
Barabarane33.5
Incularino34.3
Maganja29.8
Man’guna38.6
Matapata44.5
Mondlane37.3
Muaha36.8
Mute36.6
N’gueo43.2
Ncumbi44.7
Ngueo43
Olumbe37.5
Patacua27
Quelimane34.1
Quilaua40.3
Quionga40.4
Quirinde37.3
Quitunda31.1
Quiuia21.1
Senga32.8
Overall36.3

Figure 17: Average age of the deceased per location.

Appendix

LocationgenderbeheadedshotkidnapeddrownedmissingunknownotherTotal
BagalaF3340400 
BagalaM1313120520 
BarabaraneF310201210 
BarabaraneM17161602000 
IncularinoF1210802700 
IncularinoM46411504410 
MaganjaF6243500 
MaganjaM151673600 
Man’gunaF0000100 
Man’gunaM101420500 
MatapataF0400500 
MatapataM41232400 
MondlaneF2210300 
MondlaneM47431200 
MuahaF0550701 
MuahaM23161302102 
MuteF6311600 
MuteM1812221200 
N’gueoF0110100 
N’gueoM4631600 
NcumbiF0220800 
NcumbiM117501000 
NgueoM1000000 
OlumbeF0033700 
OlumbeM1417151300 
PatacuaF2313000 
PatacuaM1707000 
QuelimaneF22232153700 
QuelimaneM48553976000 
Quelimaneunknown00000018 
QuilauaF67501400 
QuilauaM22291403700 
QuiongaF31001100 
QuiongaM71240800 
QuirindeM0240220 
QuitundaF0000710 
QuitundaM5200100 
QuiuiaF0220100 
QuiuiaM0210300 
SengaF0030300 
SengaM2210400 
unknownunknown0000001 
Total 330366209454327221411

Figure 18: Table showing the number of each type of death. There are several instances where multiple causes of death have been recorded for one person, resulting in the total count (1411) being greater than the total number of deaths (1402).

Locationgenderagebeheadedshotkidnapeddrownedmissingunknownother
BagalaF0-100000100
BagalaF10-200000100
BagalaF20-302000000
BagalaF30-401110200
BagalaF40-500110000
BagalaFunknown0120000
BagalaM10-201000000
BagalaM20-302310100
BagalaM30-403320200
BagalaM40-504210000
BagalaM50-600310000
BagalaM60-702100110
BagalaMunknown1170110
BarabaraneF0-101200200
BarabaraneF10-200110000
BarabaraneF20-301200500
BarabaraneF30-400410400
BarabaraneF50-601100000
BarabaraneFunknown0000110
BarabaraneM10-202120100
BarabaraneM20-302730300
BarabaraneM30-409570900
BarabaraneM40-502120500
BarabaraneM50-601120200
BarabaraneMunknown1100000
IncularinoF0-100100200
IncularinoF10-2010201000
IncularinoF20-3062201000
IncularinoF30-403520400
IncularinoF40-501110000
IncularinoF70-800100000
IncularinoFunknown1010100
IncularinoM0-100010100
IncularinoM10-202320500
IncularinoM20-308510700
IncularinoM30-401417701210
IncularinoM40-50189301400
IncularinoM50-602200400
IncularinoM60-700100000
IncularinoMunknown2410100
MaganjaF0-105010200
MaganjaF10-201001100
MaganjaF20-300111000
MaganjaF30-400001200
MaganjaF40-500010000
MaganjaF50-600110000
MaganjaM0-102100300
MaganjaM10-202212200
MaganjaM20-303230000
MaganjaM30-405311100
MaganjaM40-502310000
MaganjaM50-601100000
MaganjaM60-700410000
Man’gunaF0-100000100
Man’gunaM0-102000000
Man’gunaM10-200010000
Man’gunaM20-302000000
Man’gunaM30-401100300
Man’gunaM40-502210100
Man’gunaM50-602000100
Man’gunaM60-701000000
Man’gunaMunknown01100000
MatapataF10-200200100
MatapataF20-300000200
MatapataF30-400100000
MatapataF40-500000100
MatapataF50-600100100
MatapataM0-100000100
MatapataM20-300200000
MatapataM30-400310200
MatapataM40-502102100
MatapataM50-602300000
MatapataM60-700120000
MatapataM70-800100000
MatapataM80-900100000
MondlaneF0-100000100
MondlaneF10-201100200
MondlaneF20-301010000
MondlaneF30-400100000
MondlaneM0-100000200
MondlaneM10-200100000
MondlaneM20-300100000
MondlaneM30-402322500
MondlaneM40-500010200
MondlaneM50-601211200
MondlaneM60-701000100
MuahaF0-100010000
MuahaF10-200110100
MuahaF20-300220100
MuahaF30-400100400
MuahaF40-500010000
MuahaF50-600100000
MuahaF60-700000100
MuahaFunknown0000001
MuahaM0-100010000
MuahaM10-200100000
MuahaM20-302560600
MuahaM30-4095501000
MuahaM40-5010300300
MuahaM50-601200200
MuahaM60-700010000
MuahaMunknown1000002
MuteF0-102001200
MuteF20-301200200
MuteF30-402000000
MuteF40-501000000
MuteF50-600100000
MuteF60-700010200
MuteM10-202100400
MuteM20-301410200
MuteM30-407410200
MuteM40-506001300
MuteM50-602201000
MuteM60-700100000
MuteM70-800000100
N’gueoF10-200100000
N’gueoF40-500010000
N’gueoF70-800000100
N’gueoM20-300301300
N’gueoM30-401210100
N’gueoM40-502110000
N’gueoM60-701000200
N’gueoM70-800010000
NcumbiF0-100010100
NcumbiF10-200000200
NcumbiF20-300000200
NcumbiF50-600010100
NcumbiF60-700200200
NcumbiM0-100000300
NcumbiM10-200000200
NcumbiM100-1100000100
NcumbiM20-301110100
NcumbiM30-403110100
NcumbiM40-502210100
NcumbiM50-600110100
NcumbiM60-704110000
NcumbiM70-801000000
NcumbiM80-900100000
NgueoM40-501000000
OlumbeF0-100000100
OlumbeF10-200001100
OlumbeF20-300011400
OlumbeF30-400001000
OlumbeF50-600000100
OlumbeF60-700010000
OlumbeFunknown0010000
OlumbeM0-100000400
OlumbeM10-200000400
OlumbeM20-303004000
OlumbeM30-401301100
OlumbeM40-5071000300
OlumbeM50-601300000
OlumbeM70-801000100
OlumbeMunknown1110000
PatacuaF0-101001000
PatacuaF10-200101000
PatacuaF20-300110000
PatacuaF30-400001000
PatacuaF40-500100000
PatacuaF60-701000000
PatacuaM0-101103000
PatacuaM10-200100000
PatacuaM20-300101000
PatacuaM30-400103000
PatacuaM40-500100000
PatacuaM50-600200000
QuelimaneF0-104431900
QuelimaneF10-204741700
QuelimaneF20-303343400
QuelimaneF30-406460900
QuelimaneF40-501140000
QuelimaneF50-602200600
QuelimaneF60-701100100
QuelimaneF70-800100000
QuelimaneF90-1000000100
QuelimaneFunknown1000000
QuelimaneM0-103730600
QuelimaneM10-207321700
QuelimaneM20-3095731200
QuelimaneM30-401517821300
QuelimaneM40-507161411700
QuelimaneM50-602220000
QuelimaneM60-703420300
QuelimaneM70-802010100
QuelimaneM80-900100100
Quelimaneunknownunknown00000018
QuilauaF0-100000100
QuilauaF10-200110100
QuilauaF20-300500700
QuilauaF30-401110400
QuilauaF40-502020000
QuilauaF50-601010100
QuilauaF60-701000000
QuilauaFunknown1000000
QuilauaM0-100000300
QuilauaM10-200100100
QuilauaM20-300340900
QuilauaM30-40913301200
QuilauaM40-509610700
QuilauaM50-601300000
QuilauaM60-702000300
QuilauaM70-801240200
QuilauaMunknown0120000
QuiongaF10-200000100
QuiongaF20-301000500
QuiongaF30-400000500
QuiongaF50-600100000
QuiongaFunknown2000000
QuiongaM20-300210000
QuiongaM30-402420100
QuiongaM40-502400300
QuiongaM50-601000400
QuiongaM60-701100000
QuiongaMunknown1110000
QuirindeM10-200010000
QuirindeM20-300100100
QuirindeM30-400120010
QuirindeM40-500000010
QuirindeM50-600000100
QuirindeM60-700010000
QuitundaF0-100000400
QuitundaF10-200000100
QuitundaF30-400000010
QuitundaF40-500000100
QuitundaFunknown0000100
QuitundaM30-401000000
QuitundaM40-503000000
QuitundaM50-601000100
QuitundaMunknown0200000
QuiuiaF0-100010000
QuiuiaF10-200100000
QuiuiaF20-300010100
QuiuiaF30-400100000
QuiuiaM0-100110200
QuiuiaM20-300000100
QuiuiaM40-500100000
SengaF10-200020100
SengaF20-300000100
SengaF30-400010000
SengaF50-600000100
SengaM0-100010000
SengaM10-200000100
SengaM20-301000100
SengaM40-500100000
SengaM50-601100200
unknownunknownunknown0000001
Total33036620945432722

Figure 19: Table showing type of each death per location, per gender, per age group. There are several instances where multiple causes of death have been recorded for one person, resulting in the total count (1411) being greater than the total number of deaths (1402).

Appendix B: Methodology

The survey was carried out by a team of six surveyors and three managers, who visited each location affected by the attack, including all six districts of Palma and 15 surrounding villages, between November 2022 and March 2023. They eventually visited 13,686 homes. Taking our lead from UN guidelines available online, which advise that surveyors visit just once to minimise the risk of re-traumatisation, we designed a simple survey that would identify affected individuals (name, gender, age, address and contact number for relatives) and categorise what happened to them (shot, beheaded, drowned, abducted, other cause of death, unknown cause of death, and missing.)

The survey was limited to those caught up in al-Shabab’s attack of March and April 2021. Categories of death were sourced explicitly to eyewitnesses; many beheadings, for instance, were carried out in front of other family members. When a killing was not witnessed, or a body indicating how someone died was not recovered, the cause of death was recorded as unknown. Several killings qualified in two different categories – when someone was beheaded and shot, for instance, or their decapitation witnessed but their body not recovered. In locations where large numbers of people had died, the list of the dead was handed to community leaders to review, to double-check identities, and ensure completeness.

We did not ask for the identity of the perpetrator. It should be noted, however, that the surveyors reported that in the vast majority of cases, the perpetrator was indicated as al-Shabab. That matches a reality in which the Mozambican security forces, police and army, mostly fled al-Shabab’s advance.

It is also crucial to note that the survey would not have been possible without the cooperation of the leadership in each community. In each location, before our surveyors deployed, our team visited the district or village leaders to explain their purpose and ask for permission to work, as long as was necessary. In all cases, this was granted willingly. In some cases, village leaders had already made their own surveys, in the expectation of a visit from a higher authority (that had not arrived). In many cases, local leaders accompanied our surveyors during their work, to reassure their constituents that the survey was being conducted with their approval.

Appendix C: Survey Context and Origin

The Islamist group of al-Shabab began its insurgency in the northern province of Cabo Delgado in 2017, affiliated to ISIS in 2019, and cut off Palma and the Afungi peninsula from the rest of the country in 2020 when it captured the port city of Mocimboa da Praia. By March 2021, al-Shabab had taken hundreds of miles of territory and its war with the state had cost 3,000 lives & displaced 750,000.

In 2019, TotalEnergies – France’s biggest company, and a global energy giants – bought the African assets of Anadarko, including its interest in the gas field known as Area 1, off Palma, and the LNG liquefaction facility under construction at Afungi. Total’s project accounts for $20 billion in investment. A second project focussed on Area 4, led by ExxonMobil, accounts for $30 billion, making the combined investment in gas extraction in northern Mozambique $50 billion, the single biggest investment ever made in Africa.

From 2017, however, the risk was that Palma and Afungi were in an expanding war zone. By mid-2020, an attack on Afungi and Palma – already surrounded by the Islamists, and now a base for hundreds of white construction contractors – seemed inevitable. Hence Total’s decision to base itself inside a fortress at Afungi. Crucially, given what was to transpire during the attack, although Afungi was designed to be big enough to house all Total’s contractors and subcontractors, those accommodation blocks had yet to be built. Instead, thousands of construction workers and their managers were living outside the Afungi perimeter, on site or at hotels in Palma, without armed security guards and exposed to any rebel advance.

Such an advance had already happened once before. In the last days of December 2020, al-Shabab fought a series of skirmishes as it moved north to the gates of Afungi. That attack prompted Total to shut down its site and evacuate its staff for three months. By contrast, however, Total’s principal construction contractor CCS, a consortium led by Saipem (Italy) and including McDermott (US) and Chiyoda (Japan), encouraged its subcontractors to return to Palma within days of the December attack. In February, Total’s chairman and CEO, Patrick Pouyanné also reassured his staff[1], Total’s subcontractors and the population of Palma that he had a new plan in place to guarantee their security, involving the deployment of 600 Mozambican soldiers at Afungi who were to protect a 25-km radius around the site, which included all of Palma. “My highest priority is security, not only of our staff but also the staff of our partners who work onshore in Mozambique,” he said. A group of Canadian human rights lawyers hired by Total also stressed the escalating risk from the insurgency, and added that knowingly operating in a war zone came with heightened responsibilities for Total.[2] Importantly, the Canadians said Total’s moral and legal duty of care covered contractors, subcontractors and all “Project-affected communities” – that is, the entire town of Palma. Total also “ultimately has the lead role” when it came to protecting lives, the lawyers wrote.

I investigated the attack for 15 months, and wrote an account of it, focusing on 183 contractors, workers and civilians besieged at the Amarula Lodge, for Outside magazine.[3] The piece won a George Polk award in April. The story criticises Total for abandoning its contractors and the people of Palma, despite its security promises and intelligence that an attack was imminent. Total, an oil and gas giant, even denied aviation fuel to the lone rescue effort, by a private military company.

But there was a gap in my reporting. Because Palma’s population of 60,000 had fled, I couldn’t reach them to ask what happened to people outside the Amarula. It wasn’t until summer 2022, after my story was out, that the population returned.

In September 2022, I went back to Palma to meet them. It was soon clear the loss of life was of a scale beyond my ability to assess alone. I heard about mass graves, a pit of 20 skulls, a dugout that sank with 50 people on board, and a base of 100 policemen wiped out. But a count of the dead was evidently of utmost importance. Without it, people couldn’t really say what had happened to them, or ask for help. But neither the state nor Total had made one – which, in the face of a seeming catastrophe, was a stunning and curious omission. Hence the decision to set up a survey group, which I financed using the Polk prize money ($25,000).

Although comparisons of this sort are somewhat distasteful, for context it’s worth noting that these figures make Palma 2021 the worst terror attack since 9/11, and the bloodiest disaster in the 164-year history of oil and gas.

Alex Perry

www.alex-perry.com


[1] https://lngprime.com/africa/total-ceo-says-giant-mozambique-lng-project-on-track/11860/

[2] https://mzlng.totalenergies.co.mz/en/system/files/atoms/files/final_hrdd_report_24_may.pdf

[3] https://www.outsideonline.com/outdoor-adventure/exploration-survival/attack-amarula-hotel-palma-mozambique-africa/.